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Summary:
Most Blue Shield plans are characterized by two distinguishing features: regu-
latory tax advantages over commercial health insurers and/or local medical society
control over plan reimbursement policies. Economists have speculated that either of
these traits could be a source of monopoly power for Blue Shield. This paper describes,
theoretically and empirically, the circumstances under which this monopoly power will
raise physicians' fees. Given the competitive nature of the for-profit segment of the
health insurance market, a Blue Shield plan could operate in several markets — i.e.,
with/without a tax advantage and control by jurisdictional medical society (ies) , or
with/without a tax advantage and no control by jurisdictional medical society (ies)
.
There is no a priori reason for policy concern over a plan operating without tax
advantage or medical society control since the health insurance is, under those circum-
stances, competitive. The empirical findings of this paper indicate that only the plan
with a tax advantage and medical society control induces significantly higher physicians'
fees. The policy recommendation derived from this result is straightforward. Any rule
specifying limited medical society affiliation with or control over the filial Blue
Shield plan should be focused on plans maintaining a tax advantage over health insurers.
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Research amassed within the past five years on Blue Cross-Blue
Shield suggests that the nation's largest network of private health in-
surance plans reduces consianer welfare [2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 28],
Freeh (1979) in a recent paper, states that the basic concliision of pre-
vious studies "is that the Blues, largely as a result of their special
position in medicine, hold some market or monopoly power and that they
use this power to benefit the providers of care and those operating the
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, but at the expense of consumers in
general" [11]. While Freeh admits there are serious disagreements on
many points, he finds "the overall picture painted by the critics of
the Blues' power convincing" [11].
There is little disagreement that Blue Cross or Blue Shield, be-
cause of regulatory advantages and/or close links with organized provider
groups, possess potential market power which could result in supra-
competitive hospital charges or physicians' fees. However, theoretical
and empirical research on the "Blues" is inadequate because plans are
treated as either 1) homogeneous entities, or 2) insufficiently differ-
entiated. This is unfortimate because certain plan characteristics de-
termine each plan's potential market power, and hence, each plan's con-
duct. It is conceptually and empirically inappropriate to treat these
plans as similar institutions when their effects on hospital costs or
physicians' fees vary according to certain distinguishing characteristics.
Essentially, Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans contain two distin-
guishing features: regulatory tax advantages, and provider control over
the level of plan reinbursenent made Co hospitals and doctors. Not sur-
prisingly, recocmendations to alter plan decision making structure or
change the regulator>' environment in which the plans operate have focused
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on income augmenting features of these charcteristics. Unfortunately,
previous research has provided a basis for implementing policy based on
one characteristic without considering or evalxiating the effect of
the other. For instance, Freeh and Ginsberg conclude that "...there
is evidence that regulatory advantages of Blue Cross plans are used
to raise market share and also to allow administrative costs to rise."
[15, p. 234]. Conversely, a recent FTC report pertaining to physician
control of Blue Shield plans considers only the effects physician domin-
ation of Blue Shield plans have on fees and empirically ignores the inter-
face between such control in the regulatory environment within which the
plans operate [19]. This is unfortunate because in the competitive health
insurance market, i.e., one without favorable Blue Shield regulations, such
control would have little normative economic significance. Hence, use of
antitrust policy to curb physician control in plans may increase welfare
only in those plans which operate in non-competitive health insurance
markets, i.e., plans with a tax advantage. Alternatively, adopting new
state legislation which revokes the "Blues" tax advantage will be inef-
fective if provider affiliation with the plan is the primary determinant
of higher medical costs. This paper provides a theoretical framework for
evaluating the effects of Blue Shield plans, and empirically determines
under what conditions regulatory treatment of Blue Shield or medical
society control over the plan leads to higher physician fees.
The paper is organized into three sections. First, the origins of
Blue Shield monopoly power are discussed in some institutional detail.
Subsequently, a stylized model of the health insurance market is pre-
sented analytically depicting the effects of Blue Shield monopoly power.
The subsequent section empirically ascertains which, if any, of these
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sources of market power are responsible for affecting surgical charges.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the econometric results as
they pertain to future efforts by antitrust enforcement (and other)
agencies to diffuse medical society control over Blue Shield plans.
Section II: A Discussion of Blue Shield Monopoly Power and A
Stylized Model of the Health Insurance Market
Most Blue Shield plans were formed during the 1940 's and 1950 's by
county and state medical societies. Plans typically secured passage of
enabling legislation from respective states which sometimes stipulated
organized medical or physician control over the plan, and usually
exempted plans (or subjected them to reduced rates) from payment of
state income and premium taxes. Additionally, almost all Blue Shield
plans are exempt from payment of state and federal income taxes, and in
certain states, incur decreased local and/or state property tax liabil-
ity. State premium taxes are generally assessed on an ad valorem basis,
the tax rate ranging from 2-4Z of premiian income depending upon the
state.
The early Blue Shield plans obtained much of their support from
the American Medical Association which encoxiraged the formation of medi-
cal society-sponsored, nonprofit health insurance plans. Because of
their obvious links with organized medicine, speculation has flourished
that medical society control of Blue Shield plans could result in supra-
competitive fees in the physicians' services market. However, the poten-
tial for parental medical societies to exert monopolistic influence over
filial plans has been mitigated by certain developments.
Growth in the size of plans rendered the interface between plans,
subscribers and the providers more complex. Subscribers of physician
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or medical society controlled plans were alienated by high premiums they
felt resulted from high doctor fees. Stringent reimbursement methods,
on the other hand, alienated the providers and lead to a loss of support
from organized medicine; an aspect of Blue Shield that differs from
commercial insurers. These conflicts led to growth in the participa-
tion of the public in plan decision making while growth in plan size
led to demands for larger and more specialized administrative units.
The result has been a decrease in the influence over plan policies and
decision making by organized medicine and an increasing influence by
plan administrators and subscribers, each of whom have differing ob-
jectives.
Current evidence suggests considerable variation in the extent of
medical society control over individual plans. In 1977, eleven plans
operated without the sanction of the jurisdictional medical society(ies)
,
and in 23 of the 58 plans comprising the data base used in this study,
medical societies played no formal role in the selection of members to
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the plan's board of directors."
The growth in plan membership and consequent rise in administrator
responsibility/ status creates an interesting property rights conflict
between administrators and sponsoring medical societies. Since plans
are nonprofit organizations there is no direct transfer of wealth to
each of these groups via stock dividends, or other forms of profit shar-
ing. Therefore, the only way each group can financially benefit from
controlling plan decision making is by competing for and absorbing plan
premiums.
Medical societies acting on behalf of various physicians who receive
reimbursement from the plan would attempt to capture plan revenues by
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evaliiating and expanding plan fee schedules. The most common strategy
employed to assure this result is preserving medical society control of
the plan Board of Directors. Control of plan boards could be achieved by
stipulating the board members be approved by the jurisdictional medical
society. Those plan boards being more responsive to medical society
demands than where no medical society control exist could legislate more
liberal plan reimbursement by (1) stipulating more frequent updating of
plan fee schedules, (2) adopting lenient rules for the determination of
usual customary and reasonable fees, and (3) broadening the range of
covered services typically delivered by physicians. In other words the
immediate impact of medical society control over plan decision making is
on the rtiles used to determine the level of plan reimbursaaent. We do
not, however, have accurate data reflecting the various reimbursement
features on every plan. Hov/ever, it is reasonable to argue that the
separate criteria used by plans to determine payment levels is less im-
portant than the existence of medical society control, since such con-
trol will result in the adoption of a set of reimbursement policies and
criteria which maximizes payment to physicians. Obviously strategies
that increase plan reimbursements raise the demand for and price of
physicians services.
Alternatively, plan administrators could absorb revenues through
administrative slack—opting for more staff, higher salaries, and more
comfortable surroundings. This would reduce the amount of potential
insurance coverage offered by the plan.
If the health insurance market were competitive, administrators or
medical societies (acting as the bargaining agent for member physicians)
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could not succeed in capturing rents. A competitive insurance market
would produce the optimal mix of insurance coverage and administrative
costs; any deviation from that combination by a Blue Shield plan would
place the plan at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis another insurer.
Thus, the property rights conflict between administrators and medical
societies has positive economic significance only when the health in-
surance market contains non-competitive elements. Regulatory tax ad-
vantages given to Blue Shield plans and medical society efforts to force
other insurers to duplicate a Blue Shield plan's higher level of cover-
age represent the primary/ non-competitive elements.
The premium tax exemption granted to Blue Shield plans gives them
a competitive advantage vis-a-vis for-profit commercial health insurers,
not exempt from pa>'ment of those taxes. In general, the premium tax ad-
vantage held over foreign commercial underwriters (those with home
offices outside the taxing jurisdiction) exceeds the advantage main-
tained over domestic companies (those with home offices in the taxing
state). For instance, in 1976, the mean administrative expense (net of
premium taxes) as a percentage of premium income for Blue Shield plans
not merged with Blue Cross was 11.6% [9]. Given a mean Blue Shield tax
advantage over foreign commercial underwriters of 1.76%, a typical non-
merged plan has a 13% cost advantage over for-profit insurers.
The tax advantage creates a subsidy which would be used by plans
in several ways. First, if the subsidy were used efficiently, the plan
would increase insurance coverage and force the for-profit companies to
exit from the health insurance market. However, the empirical observa-
tion that commercial firms continue to enter and operate in the market
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has prompted researchers to question whether the Blues are efficiently
using the tax advantage. The property rights issue discussed above sug-
gests that either administrator or medical society-controlled plans
could exhaust the subsidy through administrative slack or overinsurance
.
In fact, the presence of administrator or medical society control over
a plan should, in theory, dictate how the subsidy is used to the pecun-
iary gain of either party. If that component of the premium constitut-
ing the subsidy were internalized by either group, commercial companies
could remain in the market.
A medical society-controlled Blue Shield plan could produce rents
for area physicians if it possessed market power independent of the tax
4
advantage. For instance a plan could force the coomercial insurers to
duplicate its coverage levels by sanctioning a physician boycott of com-
mercially insured patients. This situation actually transpired in Oregon
in the early 1940' s. Commercial insurers were forced to follow Oregon
Blue Shield's reimbursement policies after the Oregon State Medical
Association sanctioned a physician boycott of commercially insured
policyholders. While boycott may be an effective tactic for tampering
practices of aggressive commercial underwriters, it constitutes a per se
violation of federal (and state) antitrust laws. However, implicit
threats of boycott, as well as commercial company recognition of Blue
Shield as the "market leader" coxild achieve the same desired result.
The above discussion indicates that Blue Shield plans fall into
four categories, 1) no ta:c advantage, aon-medical society-controlled,
2) tax advantage, non-medical society-controlled, 3) no tax advantage,
medical society-controlled, and 4) tax advantage, medical society-
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controlled. The below model theoretically illustrates the possible ef-
fects which these different plans coiild have on the qtjantity of health
insurance coverage, and hence, the demand for and price of physicians'
services.
A Stylized Model of the Health Insurance Market
The foundation for the model comes from Ehrlich and Becker [5].
It is separated into three parts. First, the competitive equilibrium
position of an insurance market without Blue Shield regulatory tax ad-
vantages is described. Next, the effect of the premium tax exemptions
is incorporated into the model, and the change in the industry competi-
tive equilibrium is analyzed. Finally, medical society efforts to in-
crease insurance coverage in plans with and without a tax advantage
are discussed.
The model assumes that individuals maximize expected utility of
income over two states of nature, health and sickness. Income in the
sick state (I ) can be augmented by the purchase of health insurance.
Purchases of health insurance require payment of a positive premium
which reduces the level of income in the health state (1^,) • Individuals
face probabilities of health and sickness of p and 1-p, respectively.
Additionally, they exhibit global risk aversion (utility functions are
strictly concave) while insurers are assumed to be risk neutral. Con-
smner preferences are represented by a Von Neumann-Morgenstem expected
utility function.
Prior to the purchase of insurance, individuals are endowed with
a particvilar level of wealth in each state. In Figure I, this is shown
as point E, with coordinates I^ and I„, Endowment point E lies on
IncoBe
State
S
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FIGURE I
A GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET
•
t
Idl
/
45^-
Income State H
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expected utility indifference curve U . The locus of all points denot-
ing equal incomes in states H and S is given by the 45" line. The ver-
tical distance between E and the 45" line gives the level of medical
expenditures if state S occurs. Any purchase of insurance is assumed
to move individuals "northwest" toward the 45" line.
Consider an underwriter willing to supply insurance at odds p and
1-p. Expected underwriting profit, E(tt ), for the insurer is given by:
(1) E(tt^j) = p(lj - I^) + (l-p)(lj - 13)0.
e e
where, L^ - I„, represents premiums (PR) paid, 1„ - I„ denotes reimburse-
ments (R) , or claims payment in state S, and a is the loading charge,
such that 1 < a < ®. Assuming a competitive insurance market with
free entry, expected economic profits can be set to zero and solved for
Ij, - L, to obtain:
(2) l^-i^=-P(i|- 1^)0..
where P = (l-p)/p, and Pa gives the market price of insurance, or, the
rate which income in the health state can be exchanged for income in
the sick state.
Consumers are assumed to maximize expected utility of income over
states S and H. Expected utility is expressed as:
(3) E(U) = p(U^) + (l-p)(Ug).
Maximizing (3) subject to (2) (the zero profit condition for the in-
surer) gives the following Lagrangian expression:
(4) L = pU(I^) + (l-p)U(l2) + X{I^ -
^H
+ PC^s
^S^''^'
-11-
Differentiacing (4) with respect to I^, I , and A gives the following
first order conditions for a maximum:
(5) L = PU'(Iji) - X = 0.
(6) L^ = (l-p)U'a„) - XaP - 0.
Dividing (5) by (6) yields;
PU'(V
(8) (l-p)U'(l5) aP a(l-p)
Condition (8) states that consumers will maximize expected utility where
the ratio of the expected marginal utilities of income in states H and
S, equals the reciprocal of the market price of insurance. Since, a
must be greater than one (a positive markup), the marginal utility of
income in state S will exceed the marginal utility of income in state
H. This iiqilies that less than complete coverage will be purchased.
The optimal policy in a competitive insurance market is depicted as
Q
point L in Figure 1. The horizontal distance between E and L measures
premiums paid, and the vertical distance captures benefits (to the policy-
holder) or reimbursement (by the underwriter)
.
Blue Shield Tax Advantages
The first part of the model assumed that all underwriters offered
insurance at identical prices. However, enabling legislation in most
states excludes Blue Shield (and Blue Cross) from payment of state and
local premium ta:ces . In theory, the exemptions will permit Blue Shield
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to realize a cost advantage in the sale of health insurance and force
the commercial companies to exit from the industry.
Functionally, the effect of the tas advantage is to lower a for
Blue Shield relative to the commercial underwriters. Graphically, this
rotates (clockwise) the zero profit constraint for Blue Shield around
point E in Figure 1, The extent of the rotation depends on the size of
Blue Shield's tax advantage. Iso-profit line EM' denotes the set of
break-even policies for Blue Shield given a certain level of tax advan-
tage. Blue Shield can offer policy D, identical in coverage to policy
L, for a lower premium. Alternatively, higher coverage policy E can
be sold for the same premium as L. Any policy offered to the left of
T along EM', makes consumers better off than policy L. Since T provides
a lower level of coverage than L, expected utility will necessarily in-
crease if the tax advantage is used by Blue Shield to raise coverage.
9
"Diis can be determined by finding the sign of:
dl„ -XP + -pU'(I„)p(I^ - I_)aP
(9) -^= 2 s S ^^^
da -(l-p)U"(l2) - pU"(I^)(aP)^
Appendix I shows the sign of (9) to be unambiguoiosly negative.
Hence, a lower a results in the purchase of more insurance. Blue
Shield's policy, given the tax advantage, is shown as point C along EM'.
Policy C places consumers on a higher expected utility indifference
curve than policy L. Therefore, by efficiently utilizing its tax ad-
vantage to raise insurance coverage. Blue Shield can force the exit of
the commercial health underwriters.
As stated above, the commercial companies may remain in the market
if administrators or physicians who control Blue Shield plans use the
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subsldy in a manner that does not maxLmlze constmer welfare, i.e.,
point C. To see how this could happen, rettim to Figxire I. If the sub-
sidy is captxired by administrators. Blue Shield's cost advantage dis-
sipates and zero profit constraint £H' would shift down to EM; the tax
advantage would produce no change in insurance coverage, as the subsidy
is absorbed by admins trative slack (higher a) . Alternatively, medical
society-controlled plans could exhaust the subsidy by oversupplying in-
surance. This wovild result in the offer, for instance, of policy Q
along EM'. Policy Q provides such relatively complete insurance that
individuals are indifferent between it and policy L, offered by the for-
profit companies. Hence, medical society- controlled plans with a tax
advantage induce the sale of too much insurance (relative to policy C)
.
Medical society-controlled plans without a tax advantage, could
attecpt to offer policy Q', identical in benefit to Q. However, in a
competitive insurance market, with perfect information, consumers would
choose to purchase policy L, offered by the commercial companies. A
medical society-dominated plan offering Q would be placed at a competi-
tive disadvantage unless it possessed market power which could be exer-
cised against the commercial insurers.
The model describes four possible settings in which Blue Shield
plans operate. In three of those settings, it Is conceivable that Blue
Shield could raise the demand for and price of physicians' services.
A plan without a tax advantage or medical society control, would oper-
ate in a competitive health insurance oarket. A priori , there is no
reason co expect such a plan to deviate from the competitive combina-
tion of insurance coverage and administrative costs. A plan with a
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tax advantage could use the subsidy efficiently to increase insurance
coverage. However, efficient use of the subsidy will be less likely
in administrator and medical society-controlled plans. The former will
exhaust the subsidy through administrative slack resulting in coverage
less than or equal to the competitive level. Inefficient administrator-
controlled plans will not, therefore, have an elevating effect on
physicians' fees. A medical society-controlled plan with a tax advan-
tage would absorb the subsidy generated by the tax advantage through
overinsurance. Lastly, a medical society-controlled plcin without a
tax advantage, could succeed as a price or "quality" leader by inducing
the commercial firms to duplicate its higher level of coverage. Medical
society control over Blue Shield in these last three markets, could re-
sult in supra-competitive physicians' fees. The ensuing section de-
velops and performs the statistical test necessary to determine whether,
ceteris paribus
, higher surgical fees exist in markets where 1) the
Blue Shield plan maintains a tax advantage over commercial insurers,
2) the Blue Shield plan is medical society-controlled and possesses a
tax advantage, and 3) the Blue Shield plan is medical society-controlled
but maintains no tax advantage over commercial underwriters.
Section III: Estimation and Results
A surgical fee equation utilizing pooled cross section-time series
data was used to estimate the effect of Blue Shield monopoly power on
unit fees (conversion factors) for surgical procedures across Blue Shield
market areas. The dependent variable, RCF, is the mean deflated conver-
sion factor for surgical services in a Blue Shield market area. Nominal
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meaa conversion factors used to compute RCF come from the Health In-
surance Association of Anerica (HIAA) Prevailing Health Care Charges
System (PHCS) . The conversion factors are derived by the HLAA using
the 1964 California Relative Value Study. Three PHCS series, represent-
ing 1974, 1975, and 1976, were used in the econometric work.
Each PHCS contains surgical charges submitted by practitioners
treating commercially insured policyholders with major medical coverage.
Fees are collected for approximately 250 three digit zip code areas
around the country. The zip code areas are aggregated (where appro-
priate) by the HLAA to determine prevailing charge areas and physicians'
cxistomary fees. These fees are assumed to be representative of market
prices for physicians' services. If price discrimination on the basis
of insurance coverage were still a widespread pricing phenomenon, use
of HIAA conversion factors as proxies for market fees would not be justi-
fied. However, Sloan and Feldman (1977) remark that point-of-delivery
price discrimination is no longer a widespread pricing strategy among
doctors [27].
Fees submitted for individual procedures were not used as the de-
pendent variable because the model develoeped in section II yields no
insight into which surgical fees sbjould be affected by Blue Shield
monopoly power. Mean conversion factors were calculated for each Blue
Shield market area and deflated by an area price index, using the
12
method described by Sloan (1976)
.
The regressors used in the surgical fee equation are divided into
-wo sets. The first group of independent variables reflect Blue Shield
cax advantages and medical society control. The second set is included
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to iinprove the efficiency of the estimation since regressors in this
set account for conditions in the physicians' services market external
to the existence of Blue Shield market power. A priori , they are ex-
pected to exhibit little or no relationship to the "monopoly power"
variables. However, exclusion of these regressors would have raised
the error variance on the coefficient estimates of the Blue Shield
variables. This causes the null hypothesis of no linear relationship
between the Blue Shield monopoly power variables and RCF to be accepted
with greater frequency.
Three Blue Shield related variables were used in the surgical fee
equation. The first two measure the extent of medical society control
over the Blue Shield plan. Medical societies can dictate plan reim-
bursement policies by controlling the selection of the plan's decision
making body— the board of directors. Bylaws in each plan generally
specify how board representatives are chosen. Typically, they are com-
posed of doctors, lay representatives or subscribers, and hospital of-
ficials from the plan area. In most plans, any change in the method
and level of physician reimbursement must be legislated or approved by
the board. T01MSC0N is a binary variable, eq\ialing one if the juris-
dictional medical society(ies) either 1) elects, nominates, or approves
physician and public members to the plan board of directors or 2) has
veto power over any board approved change in the level of physician
reimbursement. MSCONDRB is also a dummy variable assigned a value of
one when the medical society controls the appointment of only the M.D.
board members. Because it is impossible to know a priori which of these
measures reflects the true or relevant extent of medical society control
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over reimbursement decisions, each of these regressors was used in the
estimation.
DIFTXF, DIFTXD, DUMTXP, and DUMTXD, are all included to measure
Blue Shield's premium tax advantage over commercial health insurers.
DIPTSF and DIFTXD are continuous, while DUMTXF and DUMTXD are binary
variables. DIPIXF is the difference between the premium tax rate as-
sessed foreign commercial insurers and the rate applied to Blue Shield.
DITTXD is the difference between the domestic commercial health under-
writer premium tax rate and the statutory rate levied on Blue Shield
plans . DUMTXF and DUMTXD are dummy variables equaling one when the
local Blue Shield plan maintains a tax advantage over foreign^commercial,
and domes tic- for-profit underwriters, respectively. Each tax advantage
variable appears separately as a regressor, and is interacted with the
relevant measure of medical society control over the plan.
Four standardizing variables are used to account for differences
in surgical fees across plans not attributable to differences in Blue
Shield market power. INS is the percentage of the Blue Shield market
area population under age 65 with medical- surgical or major medical
coverage. Positive increases in INS should raise the demand for and
price of surgical services. POP65 gives the percentage of the popula-
tion in the plan area over age 65. This variable reflects the higher
demand by the elderly for surgical services, and also the level of
Medicare Part 3 coverage in a Blue Shield area. WhUe the aged have
greater demands for physicians' services because of a higher incidence
of illness, the level of coverage under Medicare Part 3 is generally
inferior to private underwriter medical-surgical policies such as UCR
-18-
insurance. The former influence wotild be expected to increase surgical
fees while the latter effect would reduce RCF, ceteris paribus . A
priori , it is impossible to predict the directional relationship between
POP65 and RCF. SUEPOP gives the surgeon- population ratio in each Blue
Shield market area. In previous studies, the physician-population ratio
has been used as a proxy for the relative supply of doctors, a "shift"
parameter in the physicians ' demand curve, and a measure of consumer
ignorance in the physicians' services market. Without reviewing the
rationale for including this variable as a regressor in earlier research,
SURPOP is utilized in this study to pick up any or all of the above
mentioned "market" effects. SECT is defined as wages paid to clerical
help in each Blue Shield market area. This variable accounts for dif-
ferences in surgeons' costs of maintaining office practices in Blue
Shield market areas. Predicted values for SECT are generated from a
14
regression using Bureau or Labor Statistics Area Wage Surveys,
Values for each SECT observation are deflated by the area price index
described above.
The fee equation can be written as:
(10) RCF = B + B^DIFTXF + B DIFTXF * MSCONDRB + B^MSCONDRB + B^INS +
B^POP65 + B, SURPOP + BISECT + E.
5 6 /I
where, B^ is the intercept and E is the population disturbance term.
The coefficient of DIFTXF (or the relevant tax advantage measure) mea-
sures the effect on deflated conversion factors of the tax advantage in
plans without medical society control. 3_ reflects the effect of no-
tax advantage-medical society-controlled plans on fees. B„ measures
-19-
the oarginal impact en fees attributable to aedical society-controlled
plans with a ta:-: advantage. The sum of 3^ and 3_ indicates the overall
affect of nedical society control over Blue Shield in plans with a tax
advantage.
Equation (10) was estimated using three years of pooled data. A
covariance model, as well as ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation
were used initially to determine whether the intercept term varied
across temporal and spatial observations. For the different tax advan-
tage measures, and the two proxies of medical society control over the
plan, the F-statistic calculated to determine whether pooling and OLS
was appropriate was significant at the 1% level or better. Hence, OLS
could not be used. The error components estimation technique specified
by Fuller and Battese (1974) was utilized [11]. The Fuller-Battese
method requires the estimation of four least squares equations. The
first three are used to obtain weights to reflect the temporal, spatial,
and random components of the error variance. The weights are subsequently
used in the fourth equation to obtain generalized least squares (GLS) esti-
aates of the coefficients. Since R" and F statistics are of dubious value
in GLS estimation, they are not reported [3, 17]. Mean square error,
another measure of goodness-of-f it, is reported for each equation.
Table I shows that the effect of the tax advantage on fees in non-
medical society-controlled plans is positive in only two of the eight
reported equations. In four of these (10b, lOd, lOf, lOh) non-medical
society-controlled tax advantage plans have a negative but insignificant
impact on fees. In estimated equation 10b, a plan with a tnean premium
-20-
TABLE I
Summaiy of Reaulca
Surgical Fee EquAClon
Dependent Variable Is Real Commlaslon Factor (RC7)
10a 10b 10c lOd lOe lOf lOj
Independent
Variable
Intercept 4.673
(4.133)
5.048
(4.633)
4.951
(3.740)
5.041
(4,667)
DIFTXJ .075
(.439)
D1FT3D -.197
(-1.373)
DDKTXP -.135
(-.172)
DUMTXD -,269
(-1.413)
lOh
4.308 5.153 5.082 5.131
(4.876) (5.441) (4.304) (5.442)
.073
(.444)
-.197
(-1.475)
-.144
(-.192)
-.257
(-1.480)
TOTMSCON*
DIP13!?
TOTMSCON*
DIFT3D
TOTMSCON*
DCMT3F
TOTMSCON*
DCnXD
MSCONDBB*
DtFTXP
MSCONDRB*
DIFTXD
MSCONDRB*
nrvm?
MSCONDRB*
nrvTm
TOTMSCON
-.U8
(-.571)
.153
(.889)
.130
(.158)
.166
(.553)
.537 .204 .203 .231
(1.237) (.718) (.250) (.819)
-.115
(-.6U)
.158
(1.028)
.144
(.187)
.203
(.860)
MSCONDRB
INS
POP65
snspop
SECT
M.S.E.
D.F.
.219 .209 .217 .204
(.973) (.947) (.946) (.925)
-.076 -.075 -.077 -.079
(-1.290) (-1.30) (-1.29) (-1.386)
-.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
(-1.233) (-1.239) (-1.265) (-1.251)
.963 .948 ,962 ,956
(5.240) (5.194) (5,221) (3,254)
.535 ,200 .194 ,218
(1.379) (1,029) (1.039) (.908)
.183 .180 .187 ,181
(1.023) (1.029) (1.039) (1.03)
-.074 -.072 -.074 -.075
(-1.616) (-1.591) (-1.612) (-1.67)
-.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
(-1.299) (-1.307) (-1.328) (-1.33)
,934 .921 .933 .926
(5,326) (5.767) (5.805) (5.803)
.07 .07 ,0 7 .07 .06 ,06 ,06 .06
118 118 118 118 163 163 163 163
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tax advantage (.998 percent) over domestic for-profit insurers, lowers
unit conversion factors by approximately $.20 (.998 X -.197). The in-
significant effect of the tax advantage on fees in these plans suggests
administrative slack or inefficiency. Adicinistrators in these plans
absorb the tax subsidy through inefficiency, reducing the potential
amount of coverage the plan can offer.
However, the result is not inconsistent with the possibility that
administrator controlled plans use the tax advantage efficiently to pro-
vide insufficient coverage. For instance, in Figure 1, T reflects a
level of coverage consistent with such a policy. Indeed, the negative
coefficient on the tax variable in equations lOB-lOD and lOF-lOH are
consistent with administrators using the tax advantage efficiently to
lower coverage. At a minimum, however, the coefficients of tax variables
imply that administrators do not use the tax advantage to increase in-
surance coverage which would result in an increase in physician fees.
The total effect of medical society-controlled plans given a Blue
Shield premium tax advantage is represented by the sum of B. and B-
(3^ + B.TAIi in plans where the tax advantage is measured continuously).
Table II reports these coefficient sums and t statistics for each of the
eight reported equations. The impact of positive-tax advantage-medical
society-controlled plans on RCF ranges from $.32 to $.42. Given a mean
real conversion factor of :?8.27 in these plans, medical society control
over Blue Shield raises unit fees, on average, between 4 and 5". For
all the equations, this positive impact on fees is significant at the
lOJo le'jel or better.
However, the marginal effect of medical society-controlled plans
with a tax advantage on RCF is not significantly greater than the effect
-22-
TABLE II
The Effect of Medical Society Controlled Blue Shield
Plans on RCF in Plans Maintaining a Tax Advanage Over
Commercial Health Insurers
Equation lOa^ lOb^ 10c lOd lOe^ lOf*^ lOg lOh
B- + B_ .32 .35 .33 .39 .33 .36 .33 .42
"t" 1.84** 1.75** 1.47* 1.90** 1.90** 1.80** 1.65** 2.10***
Std. Err. .173 .200 .224 .265 .173 .200 .200 .200
a The mean tax advantage maintained over foreign commercial
insurers is 1.782 percent.
b The mean tax advantage maintained over domestic commercial
insurers is .9 98 percent.
c The mean tax advantage maintained over foreign commercial
insurers is 1.769 percent.
d The mean tax advantage maintained over domestic commercial
insurers is .998 percent.
* Significant at the .10 level (one tailed test).
** Significant at the .05 level (one tailed test).
*** Significant at the .025 level (one tailed test).
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on RCF of medical society-controlled plans without a tax advantage.
Thus a policy aimed solely at the elimination of "doctor control" would
accomplish little by way of providing for more efficient insurance in
those plans without a tax advantage. The coefficient on the interaction
tezm is never statistically significant at conventional levels. Recall,
it Is the combined effects of taxes and doctor control that is positive
and statistically significant. Six of the eight reported equations show
positive interaction term coefficients. The two equations where the
interaction coefficient is negative measure the tax advantage as the
difference between the premium tax rate levied on foreign commercial
underwriters and the local Blue Shield plan. The negative sign on the
interaction coefficient in these equations is not surprising since
plans maintaining a tax advantage over foreign companies are not neces-
sarily given preferential treatment over domestic insurers. However,
the converse is always true. Thus, a positive tax advantage over
foreign commercial insurers is less comprehensive and provides a smaller
possible subsidy to be absorbed by physicians or administrators. As a
result, the coefficients of B. and B^ are less likely to be significantly
different from zero in equations where a tax advantage exists over
foreign underwriters.
Turning to the standardizing variables, the coefficient of INS is,
as expected, positive. However, it is never statistically significant.
A 1% rise in the percentage of a Blue Shield market area's population
with either medical-surgical cr major medical coverage raises RCF by
approximately S,02, ceteris paribus .
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POP65 generally impacts negatively on RCF, A 1% rise in the per-
centage of the market area's population over age 65 lowers real conver-
sion factors from between $.07 and $.08, depending on the equation.
A rise in the surgeon population ratio of 10% lowers RCF by only
$.00001. The coefficient of SURPOP is never statistically different
from zero at conventional significance levels. SECT shows a strong
positive relationship with RCF. A $1.00 increase in real wages paid
to physicians* clerical assistants raises RCF by $.90 or more in all
the estimated equations. The effect is always significant at the .001
level, or better.
Conclusion
Our results provide interesting rationale for adopting certain
public policy in the health insurance industry. The insignificant effect
of no tax advantage medical society control plans on fees suggests that
the deleterious effects of physician (and administrator) control over
Blue Shield could be eliminated if the tax advantage were abolished.
Absent Bltie Shield tax advantages, the results imply that the health
insurance market is sufficiently competitive that medical society con-
trol over individual plans does not lead to higher physician fees. Hence,
removal of the tax advantage is, as other researchers have noted, the
best policy option. However, the probability of states rescinding en mass.
Blue Shield tax advantages is not promising. The cost of executing such
policy on a state by state basis appear to be quite high. Barring re-
vision of state enabling statutes to eliminate the tax advantage, a
second best policy for reform must be adopted.
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The results imply that concern by enforcement agencies over the
extent of medical society control or affiliation with filial Blue Shield
plans is justified only when the plans maintain a positive tax advantage
over commercial health insurers. Hence, using public policy to promul-
gate a rule omitting medical society control over Blue Shield is neces-
sary in only a subset of plans. For the moment, implementation of this
rule in the nine plans without a tax advantage over domestic health under-
writers or the six plans without an advantage over foreign health insur-
ance carriers is premature, and certainly not justifiable on the basis
of economic theory.
These findings are consistent with other work performed by Eisenstadt
and Kennedy indicating that physician-controlled Blue Shield plans with
a premium tax advantage over for-profit insurers have lower administrative
costs (net of premium taxes) than non-controlled plans [9]. By forcing
administrators to be efficient, physicians will internalize the subsidy
generated by the tax advantage. Functionally, this results in an in-
crease in the level of plan reimbursement (insurance coverage). Conse-
quentially, physicians' fees will rise.
Medical societ^z-dominatad plans without a tax advantage could have
a positive effect on market fees only if commercial companies were com-
pelled to duplicate the plans' coverage level. The relationship between
medical society control over these plans and fee levels is likely to be
more tenuous, however, than for plans maintaining a tax advantage.
First, only overt acts (like boycott) would appear to guarantee submis-
sion of the for-profit segment of the market. Second, Che ease of entry
into the commercial tier of the health insurance market would suggest
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that a new entrant could easily make consumers better off by reducing
coverage back to the competitive level. Whatever monopoly rents could
be earned by physicians who are members or beneficiaries of aggressive
medical societies would be competed away through the de novo entry of
for-profit companies. Our results indicate that medical society control
over Blue Shield plans not possessing a tax advantage is less likely to
systematically raise surgical fees.
Non-medical society-controlled plans, with a tax advantage most
likely use the subsidy to increase administrative slack. No increase
in real insurance coverage and physicians' fees results. Of course,
there is a social cost attached to raising rents to administrators in
these markets. However, public policy other than application of the
federal antitrust laws is necessary for eliminating this source of in-
efficiency. Barring any immediate revision in state laws governing
non-profit health insurers, however, antitrust policy is likely to have
no effect on prices in those plans where no tax advantage exists and
disappointing results in plans where tax advantages exist due to the
possible shift of the benefits derived from the tax advantage from
physicians (in medical society controlled plans) to plan administrators;
and hence, resulting in no effect to consumers.
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Footnotes
"TChe first significant documentation of Blue Shield comes from Reed
who hypothesizes that physicians could use Blue Shield plans as vehicles
for raising their incomes [13]. Donebedian contemplates the possibility
that "when implementation of the payment system is left in the hands of
an agency such as Blue Shield, that is controlled by physicians and re-
sponsible to their wants, policy and regulations will be interpreted in
a manner most likely to aid physicians in the quest for higher prices [4],
2
Data referring to medical society control or affiliation with the
plan comes from the Blue Shield Renewal of Membership Applications .
3
The commercial segment of the health insurance market is unconcen-
trated, and conditions of free entry are assumed by most researchers. In
1976, approximately 800 for-profit or mutual companies operated nation-
wide, while 70 Blue Cross and 69 Blue Shield plans were situated in the
continental United States and Hawaii. For data on individual commercial
health insurers see [1].
4
We have dismissed the possibility that administrators in plans with-
out tax advantages possess market power. It is assumed that the market
for managers is competitive.
For a chronology and analysis of the Oregon situation see [16].
For a broader statement of this situation see [18].
The assumption eliminates the possibility of moral hazard in the
health insurance market. Conditions of moral hazard exist if the prob-
abilities of S and H depend on the quantity of insurance purchased. Ex-
clusion of moral hazard in insurance markets does not affect the analysis,
except, that with moral hazard, the equilibrium qixantity of coverage pur-
chased is less than complete. For models of insurance markets with moral
hazard see [14, 20].
The loading charge in this model constitutes all costs in excess
of the actuarial portion of the premium. An a equal to 1.2 indicates a
twenty percent markup over the act-uarial premium. An a equal to one re-
quires that insurance be sold at actuarially fair odds. Since insurers
incur costs aside from claims expenses, a is assumed to be greater than
one.
g
Policy L is analogous to the policy which would be offered by a
no tax advantage, non-medical society-controlled Blue Shield plan.
9
This partial derivative should actually be written as:
5R
_
^^S 'h
3a aa 3a
However, since the second term on the right hand side is zero, the ex-
pression given in the text is appropriate.
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Since endowment income is fixed in state S, income in that state
can increase only if insurance coverage increases.
"T^umerous other explanations can be offered for the continued
presence of firms in the conmercial segment of the health insurance mar-
ket. First, commercial companies generally sell health insurance as
part of a package to employers. Krizay and Wilson have suggested that
these firms use health coverage as a "loss leader" to induce the pur-
chase of more profitable lines like life insurance [22], Additionally,
incomplete Blue Shield (or Blue Cross) market dominance may be at-
tributable to the historic failure of the Blvies to imderwrite national
accounts. At one time this was a serious problem for both Blue Cross
and Blue Shield because benefit packages and underwriting practices
were not coordinated across plans. Although agencies were established
by the Blues to facilitate the enrollment of national organizations,
subscriber growth of these groups was retarded in the 1960's. For a
discussion of commercial health insurance as a loss leader see [6, 7,
22, 24].
12
Sloan calculates a weighted average of the cost-of-living values
in each cross-sectional area [26], Cities in Blue Shield market areas
with a corresponding cost-of-living value were taken as representative
of all urban areas within a Blue Shield plan jurisdiction. When no
city within a Blue Shield plan area had an associated cost-of-living
value reported by the BLS, the BLS city of nearest proximity was used.
The cost-of-living figure was weighted by the percentage of the Blue
Shield market area population residing in urban areas. Nonmetropolitan
cost-of-living figures were used for non-urban areas within each Blue
Shield jurisdiction. Each cost-of-living figure was divided by the
average cost-of-living figure for each year. To obtain temporally de-
flated cost-of-living valiies the cross-sectionally deflated values were
deflated by a national cost-of-living index for the respective years,
1975=100. Nominal conversion factors were divided by this cost-of-
living index to obtain real conversion factors.
For a discussion of the effects of specification bias, see [21].
14
BLS Area Wage Surveys were used for 1974, 1975, and 1976. Each
survey contains wages of secretarial or clerical help for approximately
75 SMSA's. Hourly earnings for clerical secretaries were regressed on
median city family income, dtmmy variables corresponding to the four
major census regions, and dummy variables for the years 1974 and 1975.
Approximately half of the variation in clerical wages was explained by
these regressors. Predicted nominal values for SECT were subsequently
deflated by the cost-of-living index described above.
The "t" statistic used to determine whether B„ + B- are signifi-
cantly different from zero is:
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B^DIFTZff + B.
/S^* DIFTXF" + S"^ + 2*DIFTXF*C0V(B ,B,)
\ 2
where DIFTXF is the mean tax advantage held over foreign cocmercial com-
panies, S ^ , and S"^ are the coefficient variances of B. and B-, and
A A A A
COV(B^,B ) is the covariance between B. and B.. If DUIflXD and DUMTICF are
used instead of a continuous tax advantage variable, DIFTXF would equal
one.
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